The End of History - Fukuyama
The End of the Cold War is the End of History
For Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War signifies something more than what is superficially understood. It signifies not only the end of an era of conflict, but also the end of the ideological evolution of mankind. After the fall of the Communist Party in USSR, there appears to be no substantive opposition to the Liberal Democratic Order envisaged by the States. Thus the fall of the USSR is also the defeat of the Communist Ideology as a whole, and the triumph of Liberal Democracy. We have now reached the zenith of ideological development and that while there may be certain changes made to the Liberal Democratic form of Government, there is no question of the fact that it remains the only 'viable option' for States to adopt in some form.
The concept of End of History comes from G.W.F Hegel. Fukuyama is reading Hegel from the perspective of Alexander Kojeve, who was a Russian Philosopher and taught greats such as Sartre. Kojeve while reading Hegel attempts to preserve the essence of his ideas compared to the other readers of Hegel who have invariably placed him as the successor of Marx. Marx. For Kojeve, the Battle of Jena was the proverbial EOH. The principles of the French Revolution represented by Napoléon had defeated the Prussian State. The supremacy of the principles of French Revolution had been accepted and actualized (proverbially). While the liberal state did go through various different ideological iterations of tweaks and improvements, the basic principles of the Liberal Democratic Order which were enshrined then remain the same.
The real is rational, the rational is real
How does he bring this idea from Kojeve and Hegel ? He does by first aptly arguing that it is the dialectic nature of human consciousness that drives history. As Kant said the 'unsociable sociability of man' is for Hegel the dialectic of Reason which allows for the gradual development of history. He thus argues that it is all in the realm of ideology. He substantiates his argument by quoting from the Philosophy of History where Hegel said "All that is real is rational and all that is rational is real". He argues that in this regard, the term ideology is inclusive of all identities, "religious, cultural, etc". What he at this moment fails to analyse is whether the actualization of the rational is ideology, or is it the rationalization of the real. Or maybe it is a constant process of the rationalization actualization. He is thus not very clear on the nature of ideology. He loosely uses it with the term 'consciousness'. For Fukuyama (reading Kojeve) the distinction between the rational and the actual is not substantial, it is a prima facie apparent distinction. This leads to the idea that history is rooted in a sense of prior human consciousness, thus today's consciousness becomes the historical foundation for tomorrow. It is thus consciousness that then moulds the world in its own image.
He then proceeds to critique the existing Marxist and some alt anti-Marxist discourses on this idea of 'consciousness' which argue that consciousness is a result of the economic relations of an agent with his community and the State, which is a distinct feature of orthodox Marxism. While the “Wall Street Journal” style of deterministic materialism, similarly discrediting the realm of 'consciousness' while lauding the rational profit-maximising individual as the main driver of economic growth. This he argues is grossly incorrect. Further, the inability to recognize that economic activity of the agent is causally related to his consciousness leads us to attribute 'material causes to phenomena that are generally a result of ideological change'. This he attempts to demonstrate through the drastic changes in socialist economies, such as USSR and China, which ditched Central Planning for a more Capitalistic outlook to economic development. He argues that this was not because of any material causes, but rather that the elites of these countries chose the Protestant 'wealth' over the Catholic 'poverty' (reading from Weber). Thus, it is the consciousness, the liberal consciousness in this case, which will form the homogeneous state after the fall of the USSR and the true 'Communist' China. The 'liberalization' of China, Cuba, and other Communist States represents this trend.
The liberalization of China is critical in this regard. He argues that the force of liberalization is represented through its adoption in China, for the most part, this is because it was not a western nation, which for Fukuyama has a natural propensity to become liberal, and additionally, it was communist. This made it very difficult for liberalism as an ideology to permeate into China. These changes in the reign of Deng Xiaoping were also representative of a consciousness shift. While the leaders continue to pay lip service to the ideas of“Marxism” they have recognized its fault lines and have accepted that it cannot serve as the foundation of such fast-growing economy.
Religion
Fukuyama accepts that liberalism does have an empty core. The rise of religious fundamentalism and the ethno-nationalist state, may become competitors to the liberal democratic order. Fukuyama, unfortunately, is unable to accept this contention. He argues that for now Islam is the only religion that has created a theological state. The term “Islamic Republic” is important to note. While other States may have a Christian outlook, they remain liberal as far as their political ideology is concerned. He argues that the 'political force' of Islam does not affect non-Muslim communities; thus its impact remains regional. While for other more loosely organized religions, the space provided under liberalism takes care of any religious impulses.
Nationalism
For Fukuyama, Nationalism represents a irreconcilable contradiction at the heart of Liberalism. He argues that nationalist conflict is not so much a result of liberalism but that of incomplete liberalism. One of those examples is the under-representation of minority groups. But what he fails to realize is the nationalist struggle against the evils of Liberalism. Nationalism is a complex idea which Fukuyama fails to properly appreciate. He reiterates the liberal fault of discounting nationalism failing to properly engage with it. Today, the rise of right wing populism is in part a cause of liberal myopia. They fail to provide an alternative and are still grappling with the effect of this sudden resurgence.